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REASONABLE BEHAVIOR AT THE CFPB
Norman L Silber*
INTRODUCTION
Deceptive Behavior and Consumer Regulation
The impetus for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, an agency
charged with diminishing deceit in the marketplace for financial products,
has antecedents that stretch back into the distant past. The ancient Greeks
were troubled by deceitful marketing practices-recall that Diogenes,
walking up and down the marketplace, searched in vain for an honest man.
Over the centuries, however, political leaders have usually resigned
themselves to the persistence of unethical practices by tradesmen,
considering these to be the insuppressible by-product of the contest between
buyers and sellers that takes place whenever bargains are formed. 2
American courts, notwithstanding the invocation of privity
requirements and doctrines like caveat emptor, have been willing to provide
recourse to victims of actual fraud, at root because sales transactions rooted
in deceit have never been culturally popular or understood to be
economically beneficial. During most of the nineteenth century, states and
localities took responsibility for regulating markets to establish honest
weights and measures and to promote honesty. 4 The federal government,
* Professor of Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law, Hofstra Law School; Visiting
Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Much appreciation is extended to Yelena Lyutin for her
valuable research assistance and other contributions, to my assistants Adam Sosnik and Chai
Hoang, and to Toni Aiello, professional librarian. Thanks to Susan Block-Lieb, Jean Braucher,
Edward Janger, Frank Pasquale, Katherine Porter, Patricia McCoy, David Reiss, Winnie Taylor,
Charles Whitehead, and the other participants at the Brooklyn Law School symposium "The
CFPB After a Year." Thanks to Arthur Flynn and the editors of the Journal of Corporate,
Financial & Commercial Law for the journal's editorial assistance.
1. "On one bright, clear day, Diogenes was walking up and down the market place, holding a
lighted lantern high in front of him and peering around as if searching for something. When
people gaped and asked him what he was doing, he replied, 'I am looking for an honest man."'
David Quinn, Teachings of Diogenes, http://members.optushome.com.auldavidquinn000
/Diogenes%20Folder/Diogenes.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (recounting a story told of
Diogenes).
2. See generally NORMAN I. SILBER, TEST AND PROTEST: THE INFLUENCE OF CONSUMERS
1-16 (1983) (addressing the role in the United States of one of the first consumer products testing
agencies); Norman I. Silber, From The Jungle to The Matrix: The Future of Consumer Protection
in Light of its Past, in CONSUMER PROTECTION INTHE AGE OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 15,
15-34 (Jane K. Winn ed. 2006) [hereinafter Silber, From The Jungle to The Matrix] (twentieth
century developments). See also Spencer Weber Waller et al., Consumer Protectionin the US: An
Overview, 2011 EUR. J. CONS. L. 853, available at http://ssm.com/abstract--1000226 (providing

an overview of the history of consumer protection).
3. Jonathan Sheldon, Deception, Unfair and Unconscionable Sales Practices, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT 208 (Stephen Brobeck et al. eds. 1997); see also
In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1056 (1984) ("[Deception] is harmful to consumers,

undermines the rational functioning of the marketplace, and, unlike some other practices we are
called upon to review, never offers increased efficiency or other countervailing benefits that must
be considered.").
4. JESSE VEE COLES, THE CONSUMER-BUYER AND THE MARKET 519 (1978).
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responding to new circumstances as monopolies and mass production
turned consumer problems into national phenomena, authorized independent agencies to foster competition, promote honesty in merchandising, and
mandate product safety.5
Many consumer problems come to public attention most vividly in
novels. The perils of unregulated mortgage markets received their first
brilliant exposure in Upton Sinclair's 1906 novel The Jungle.6 Those who
remember The Jungle will recall that the protagonist, Jurgis Rudkis, and
others in his immigrant family, looked forward as much as anything else to
buying a home when they came to America, and they pooled their resources
to come up with a down payment. But the process of buying a house was
frightening to them-with one snare after another. They became suspicious
of everyone with whom they dealt, and were scared of the documents they
were asked to sign.
A lawyer, who might-or might not-be reliable, assured the family
that the agreement they had been presented was a "standard" agreement of
sale, despite language which, they feared, signified that it was a rental. They
were relieved by the lawyer's assurances, and they signed the document,
without focusing on the high fees and the security provision that the
agreement contained. Toward the conclusion of The Jungle, illness, tragedy,
and the fine print have led to a default.8 The home is lost to the mortgagee,
who forecloses and resells. Sinclair writes poignantly about Yurgis's
ultimate defeat:
Their home! Their home! They had lost it! Grief, despair, rage,
overwhelmed him-what was any imagination of the thing [compared] to
this heart-breaking, crushing reality of it-to the sight of strange people
living in his house hanging their curtains in his windows, staring at him
with hostile eyes! . . . Only think what he had suffered for that house-

what miseries they had all suffered for it-the price they had paid for it!
The whole long agony came back to him. Their sacrifices in the beginning,
their three hundred dollars that they had scraped together, all they owned

5. Silber, From The Jungle to The Matrix, supra note 2 (tracing development of consumer
protection during the Progressive era). See generally Bernard Schwartz, The FederalRegulatory
Commissions, in THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF U.S. REGULATORY AGENCIES (1973) (development of regulatory agencies);
MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1995) (providing
political context); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1977) (discussing original
motives and capture by industry); RICHARD A. HARRIS & SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE POLITICS OF
REGULATORY CHANGE: A TALE OF Two AGENCIES (1993) (examining the FTC and the EPA);
THOMAS C. BLAISDELL, JR., THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: AN EXPERIMENT IN THE
CONTROL OF BUSINESS (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2008) (1932) (emphasizing the gap between
achievement and original goals).
6. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Paul Negri & Josyln T. Pine eds., Dover Publ'n Inc. 2001)
(1906).
7. Id. at ch. 4.
8. Id. at ch. 18.
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in the world, all that stood between them and starvation! And then their
toil, month by month, to get together the twelve dollars, and the interest as
well, and now and then the taxes, and the other charges, and the repairs,
and what not! Why, they had put their very souls into their payments on
that house, they had paid for it with their sweat and tears-yes, more, with
their very life-blood. Jurgis could see all the truth now. ... That first lying
circular, the smooth-tongued slippery agent. That trap of the extra
payments, the interest, and all the other charges that they had not the
means to pay, and would never have attempted to pay! . .. And now, with
this hideous injustice .. . [the Justice system] had turned them out, bag and
baggage, and taken their house and sold it again! And they could do
nothing, they were tied hand and foot-the law was against them, the
whole machinery of society was at their oppressor's command! 9
In the end, Upton Sinclair exposes a truth about this consumer financial
product: that while the purchase agreement and mortgage may or may not
have been standard, they were unquestionably opaque and oppressive.1o
Efforts to understand why consumer buyers were so frequently
victimized puzzled commentators, who came to attribute this problem to
what would now be called inherent relational disparities between buyers
and sellers. Writing in 1912, Wesley Clair Mitchell observed that
innovations in productive techniques had improved industrial efficiency and
turned the manufacturing of consumer demand into a corporate endeavor;
but factors including love, parental affection, and racial ties cemented
families together and ensured that consumption was not ever going to be a
corporate endeavor, but would be, unfortunately, "standardized in the
institution of monogamy.""
In 1938, Congress broadened the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC or
the Commission) "unfair competition" mandate, making it clear that the
Commission held a responsibility to police the market for "unfair and
deceptive practices."' 2 It was at this time that the FTC received principal
federal responsibility not only to preserve and promote fair competition
among businesses, but to prohibit unfair treatment of consumers.1 3 The FTC

9. Id.
10. Id.

11. Wesley C. Mitchell, The Backward Art of Spending Money, 2 AM. ECON. REV. 269, 270
(1912).
12. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. I1l, I 11-14 (1938) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982)) ("Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are hereby declared unlawful."); see Patricia
P. Bailey & Michael Pertschuk, The Law of Deception: The Past as Prologue, 33 AM. U. L. REV.
849, 870 (1984). Congress expanded the FTC's power after the Supreme Court ruled that the FTC
had to prove injury to competition in advertising cases, despite the widespread opposition of the
newspaper industry. See FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 649 (1931); Bailey & Pertschuk,
supra at 870.
13. See Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and
Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 96 (2003).
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has risen to this challenge on many occasions, saving the money and
economic lives of consumers.14
The subsequent history of the FTC's consumer protection activities,
however, reveals periods of passivity as well as periods of active market
vigilance.15 Part of the difficulty with making an impact on fair dealing in
consumer markets has been a matter of politics and budgets-the resources
available to agencies charged with consumer protection have not kept pace
with the magnitude of the task.'6 A more critical impediment has been those
interpretations of the FTC's statutory authority that have left many bad acts
and practices untouched-practices which confuse consumers and
misrepresent the quality, terms, and price of products.17
A lenient approach to defining and discouraging "deceptive acts and
practices" after 1980 reflects, in this view, the Commissioners' dedication
to infusing the FTC with a deregulatory spirit and to eschewing the
prevention of the victimization of the most vulnerable consumers-typical
consumers who behave normally, but irrationally, in reaction to the
stimulus of sellers.' 8 Because of limits that the FTC imposed upon itself in
this way, which continue to affect the jurisprudence of consumer protection,
we inhabit a national marketplace where the legal threshold for what is
"unfair" or "deceptive" does not correspond to our encountered experience
with unfairness or deception.
The disconnection between law and experience emanates from rules,
guidance, and decisions that vindicate only the disappointed expectations of
consumers who respond "reasonably under the circumstances" to
salesmanship and that impose expectations of rational behavior to explain
what "reasonably" means.19 Nonenforcement and under-enforcement have
14. The Federal Trade Commission Turns 100, FTC, http://ftc.gov/ftc/tumsl00/index.shtm

(last visited Sep. 15, 2012) (providing summaries of FTC milestones from 1914-2003).
15. See infra pp. 6-7 and note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Charles ofthe
Ritz Distribs.Corp. v. FTC).
16. See, e.g., Fightingthe F.T.C. Down to the Bottom Line, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1974, at 1;
Excerptsfrom Carterand Kennedy Statements on Inflation, Energy and F. T C, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.

8, 1980, at Al6.
17. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
18. For an example of how consumers can behave normally but irrationally, see infra notes
65-68 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part II. The debate between advocates of a rational choice paradigm and
advocates for appreciation of behavioral economics is decades old. See, e.g., Howard Beales,
Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J. L.
& ECON. 491 (1981); Norman 1. Silber, Observing Reasonable Consumers: Cognitive Psychology,
Consumer Behavior, and Consumer Law, 2 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 69 (1990) [hereinafter
Silber, Observing Reasonable Consumers]; Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral

Economics and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1551 (1998) (defending rational choice theory);
Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471
(1998); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199
(2006); Christoph Merkle & Martin Weber, True Overconfidence: The Inability of Rational
Information Processingto Accountfor Apparent Overconfidence, 116 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 262 (2011).
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been the result. This has led to a proliferation of objectionable behavior.
The Commission's conservative approach to these problems has increased
the danger and expense of products to consumers, including cars,
appliances, computers, and product warranties, and has increased the
number of shoddy financial products, including mortgages, insurance
policies, credit cards, and investments.20
In 2010, in response to the recent national financial difficulties spawned
by under-regulated financial product marketing behavior, Congress created
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or the Bureau) as part of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act (Dodd-Frank or the Act). 2 1 The
CFPB was charged with improving the overall quality of information and
honesty in the marketplace for financial products and now holds
responsibility for making sure that the markets of consumer financial
products and services offered by both banks and nonbanks are "fair,
,,22
transparent, and competitive.
To enable it to meet its objectives, Congress provided the CFPB with
extensive supervision, enforcement, and rulemaking authority, including the
20. See, e.g., Kimberly Janeway, When Buying Cookware, Count the Pans Not the Pieces,

CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 16, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://news.consumerreports.org/home/2012/03
/when-buying-cookware-count-the-pieces.html (warning consumers that cookware sets may have
"20 pieces, but you can only cook in five" because "[l]ids are included in the tally"); Wrinkle
Serums

Buying

Guide,

CONSUMER

REP.,

http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/wrinkle-

serums/buying-guide.htm (last updated Mar. 2012) (describing that none of the serums lived up to
the manufacturers' claims, but claims are not actionable); Assessing Exercise Infomercials'
Claims, CONSUMER

REP. (Jan.

2009)

http://www.consumerreports.org/health/healthy-living

/fitness/staying-fit/infomercial-exercise-2-08/how-they-tested/infomercial-exercise-equipment
-how-they-test.htm (explaining how "miracle" devices failed to live up to claims). Illegal financial
sales scams of many forms are rampant due to under-staffing and under-enforcement. See, e.g.,
Scamation!; Fraudis on the Rise. Protect Yourselffrom the Latest Tricks, CONSUMER REP. MAG.,

Oct. 2012, at 22, available at http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/10/protect
-yourself-from-the-latest-scams/index.htm. Alternatively, consider the following:
Even under that more conservative approach, the FTC may establish deception on a
much lesser showing than is required of a consumer suing a merchant in, say, a
common law fraud or breach of warranty action. Thus, in contrast with the common law
rules, the FTC need not show that the merchant has made a false statement (in fact, the
FTC may find even true claims deceptive); or that the merchant intended to deceive, or
indeed that anyone relied upon the statement, was deceived by it, or even injured by it..
. . It would, in fact, be more accurate to refer to the law of confusing trade practices,
rather than deceptive trade practices, because the FTC and the courts focus far more on
confusion than on deception.
Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade PracticesActs: Reconsidering the FTC

Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 444-45 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
21. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§ 1001-11 OOH, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955-2113 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.). See generallyRecent Legislation-AdministrativeLaw-Agency Design-Dodd-Frank
Act Creates the Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau-Dodd-FrankAct, Pub. L. No. 111-203,

124 Stat. 1376 (2010), 124 HARV. L. REv. 2123 (summarizing the creation of the CFPB by the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act).
22. Dodd-Frank Act § 1021, 124 Stat. at 1979-80 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511).

92

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 7

power to prevent "unfair, deceptive, or abusive" acts and practices by
exercising the authority placed at its disposal.23 Now, if its Director chooses
to do so, the CFPB has the ability to modernize the jurisprudence of
unfairness and deceptiveness and endow "abusiveness" with a strong
meaning that captures a robust understanding of what the term means. It
can, furthermore, distinguish the restrictive interpretations of reasonable
consumer behavior in areas outside financial consumer protection from new
interpretations within the scope of the CFPB's authority.
The remainder of this Article offers new possibilities. Part I addresses
the limited approach to market supervision intrinsic to earlier legal doctrine.
Part II explains the deficiencies of that jurisprudence in light of several
decades of research in behavioral psychology. Part III suggests a policy
shift to reverse current practice by focusing attention on whether sellers in a
given transaction could have avoided confusing consumers by behaving
responsibly, instead of focusing on whether buyers could have avoided
injury by behaving reasonably.
I. REASONABLE BEHAVIOR AND THE CAPACITY TO DECEIVE
Among the matters to be decided when consumer protection agencies
apply the prohibition against deception to the factual circumstances of a
bargain's formation are: (1) defining the population of consumers the
prohibition is intended to protect; (2) establishing a minimal level of
attentiveness that should be expected from members of the consumer
population who may be deceived; and (3) identifying the degree of
falsehood in a seller's representation that qualifies the representation itself
as being deceptive. Depending upon the choices made by the agency, the
protection offered by government will either expand or contract.
The high water mark for imposing consumer-protective standards for
marketplace behavior along the three lines mentioned above occurred
between 1946 and 1983. During this period, the FTC consulted its own
legislative history and interpreted its responsibility under the governing
statute to oblige it to protect the entire public-a population which, as the
U.S. Court of Appeals observed in the case of Charles of the Ritz
Distributors Corp. v. FTC, included the "ignorant, the unthinking and the
credulous."24
The FTC proceeded on the assumption that consumers did not, and
should not, be expected to exhibit entirely rational attentiveness to the
advertisements and representations, or terms and conditions, of the bargains
they struck. For example, misleading advertising included ads which
created impressions with the capacity to deceive the unthinking consumer:
23. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031, 124 Stat. at 2005 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531) (emphasis
added).
24. Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944).
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If an advertisement is capable of conveying more than one impression to
the consumer and any one of them is false or misleading, the
advertisement may be found to be false or misleading. From its own
review of an advertisement, the Commission may find impressions which
the advertisement is likely to convey to the public, and determine whether
such impressions have a tendency or capacity to deceive the public, even
in cases where a number of consumers may testify that they were not
actually deceived. In determining the tendency and capacity of an
advertisement to mislead, the Commission looks to the impression an
advertisement may make on the average consumer-the gullible and
unthinking as well as the trained and sophisticated. Indeed, the central
purpose of Section 5 is "to abolish the rule of caveat emptor which
traditionally defined rights and responsibilities in the world of
commerce."25
Commissioners took as a point of departure that sellers would often try
to exploit the weaknesses of consumers-years later, many of these
weaknesses could be described within the Commission as "cognitive
limitations" 26 -and they understood the mission of the FTC as to restrain
sellers' inclination to engage in such exploitative behavior. The marketplace
would be more efficient, and justice served better, by operating under the
proposition that consumers who did not act with the requisite skills,
educational background, or emotional level-headedness of the median
American shopper deserved to be sheltered as much or more than anyone
else. If sellers were discouraged from making representations which,
although to some extent truthful, nonetheless had the capacity to deceive,
this was an acceptable cost of regulation in the interest of safer markets and
a higher volume of market activity.2
The appointment of more new commissioners to the FTC by President
Reagan in the years following his election in 1980, however, ushered in a
different regime. 28 Against vigorous dissent, a new majority of the
Commission aligned itself with economists who embraced less market
regulation and who believed that, to function properly, markets needed to

25. In re Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 266-67 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
26. See, e.g., J. Howard Beales, 1II, Director, Bureau of Consumer Prot., FTC, Address at the
George Mason Law Review 2004 Symposium on Antitrust and Consumer Protection (Mar. 2,
2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/beales/040802adstokids.pdf (discussing "the
cognitive limitations of young children").
27. See, e.g., David A. Rice, Consumer Unfairness at the FTC: Misadventures in Law and
Economics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1983); J. Howard Beales, III, Brightening the Lines: The
Use ofPolicy Statements at the Federal Trade Commission, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1057 (2005).
28. President Regan was in office from 1981-1989. During this time, he appointed the
following FTC Commissioners: James C. Miller Ill, Terry Calvani, Daniel Oliver, and Janet
Steiger. Commissioners and Chairmen of the Federal Trade Commission, FTC (Aug. 2012),
http://ftc.gov/ftc/history/commisionerchartlegal.pdf
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encourage reasonable, "rational actors." 29 They believed that the policies
established by the FTC should allow a maximum possible range for sellers
to design and market their products, and should encourage all consumers to
balance costs against benefits to maximize their personal advantage when
they shopped. 3 0 From this perspective, the functioning of the marketplace
would not be served well by compensating consumers who were injured
because they responded irrationally or ignorantly to marketing appeals
without calculating the costs and benefits. 3 Coddling consumers
paternalistically would not punish them sufficiently for their poor habits,
choices, and abilities, and over time would produce poorly functioning
markets. 32
And so, during the early years of the Reagan administration, the FTC
issued a Policy Statement to accompany its decision in Cliffdale
Associates.3 3 In its Policy Statement, the FTC revised, and in some respects
reversed, its earlier positions. Notably, the FTC Commissioners defined
three elements necessary to conclude that actionable deception had
occurred:
First, there must be a representation, omission or practice that is likely to
mislead the consumer....
Second, we examine the practice from the perspective of a consumer
acting reasonably in the circumstances....
Third, the representation, omission, or practice must be a "material" one.34
Each new requirement diminished the likelihood that a seller might be
culpable for a deceptive advertising campaign or other sales practice.
Demanding the establishment of a "likelihood" that a seller was misleading
a consumer, for instance, imposed a higher threshold than determining
whether there was a "capacity" to mislead. Requiring "materiality" imposed
an old common law element of misrepresentation that provided sellers with
opportunities to claim that their falsehoods did not really matter. Further,
the second requirement demanded that the practice complained of should
not simply be deceptive from the perspective of someone who might buy
the product, but "from the perspective of a consumer acting reasonably in

29. This view has been rejected by many economists who would dispute that the efficient
markets hypothesis requires a commitment to consumer rationality. See, e.g., Robert Shiller, The
Sickness Beneath the Slump, N.Y.TIMES, Jun. 12, 2011, at BU6.
30. See Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism,60 ADMIN. L. REv. 323, 324

(2008).
31. Id.
32. See

THOMAS 0. McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREACRACY 3-16 (2005).

33. In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174-84 (1984) (presenting the FTC Policy
Statement on Deception).
34. Id. at 174.
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the circumstances." 3 When, if ever, it would be reasonable to act
irrationally was not explicated.
Although the Commission continued to take action against the
egregious deception of the rational and sophisticated, the basic posture of
the FTC had been transformed. The older test essentially sought to restrain
sellers from trying to exploit the innate cognitive limitations and ignorance
of consumers. The new test relaxed that standard by seeking to discover
whether a consumer who responded to a seller's representations reasonably
or rationally would be deceived.36
The change was indeed dramatic. Less than a decade afterward, the
"gullible consumer" standard for deception had been thrown into some
disrepute. Corporate advertisers petitioned the Commission arguing that
earlier restrictions on their advertising were entered at a time when the
"gullible" consumer standard prevailed, reflecting "a presumption that
consumers cannot discern for themselves whether accurate information is
'relevant' or of 'benefit."' 3 7 "This now-rejected approach," it was argued,
"inhibits the flow of accurate information to consumers without providing
significant compensating benefits in consumer protection."M
The doctrine of unfairness was also reoriented during the Reagan
administration, which had long been distinguished from "deception"
jurisprudence.39 In earlier years, the Commission asserted broad authority,
upheld by the Supreme Court, to create unfair trade practices as a new and
wide-ranging field of law:
[The] responsibility of the Commission . . . is a dynamic one: it is charged

... with utilizing its broad powers of investigation and its accumulated
knowledge and experience in the field of trade regulation to investigate,
identify, and define those practices which should be forbidden as unfair
because contrary to the public policy declared in the Act. The
Commission, in short, is expected to proceed not only against practices
forbidden by statute or common law, but also against practices not
previously considered unlawful, and thus to create a new body of law-a
law of unfair trade practices adapted to the diverse and changing needs of
a complex and evolving competitive system. 40
35. Id.

36.
37.
F.T.C.
38.

Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2nd Cir. 1944).
Petition to Vacate Consent Order at *33, In re California & Hawaiian Sugar Co., 1994
Lexis 123 (1994).
Id. But see Sovem, supra note 20, at 444-45.
39. J. Howard Beales, III, The F.T.C's Use of Unfairness Authority: its Rise, Fall, and
Resurrection, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/beales/unfair06O3.shtm (last modified June 25,
2007).
40. In re All-State Indus. ofN.C., Inc., 75 F.T.C. 465, 491 (1969); see also In re Pfizer, Inc.,
81 F.T.C. 23, 61 (1970) ("Unfairness is potentially a dynamic analytical tool capable of a
progressive, evolving application which can keep pace with a rapidly changing economy. Thus as
consumers [sic] products and marketing practices change in number, complexity, variety, and
function, standards of fairness to the consumer may also change." (footnote omitted)).
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Shortly after President Reagan appointees dominated, however, the
Commission trimmed sails by more narrowly redrawing its mission through
reinterpreting unfair acts and practices. It became incumbent on
Commission investigators to first evaluate how a sales practice would be
understood by consumers who were reasonably trying to avoid being
misled, and then to ask whether the injuries due to unfairness to these
consumers were outweighed by benefits to these consumers and to the
market for the products and services being purveyed:
The Commission felt that one of the most crucial elements in finding an
act or practice to be unfair was that consumers be injured: (1) the injury
must be substantial; (2) the injury must not be outweighed by any
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition produced by the
practice; and (3) the injury must be an injury that consumers could not
reasonably have avoided. 4 1
Congress codified the newer definition of unfairness in 1980.42 The
Commission stated in policy guidance that substantial injury to consumers
existed when it could be demonstrated that the practice did "a small harm to
a large number of people or it raises a significant risk of concrete harm." 4 3
As the FTC elaborated its approach in subsequent years, it became evident
that a finding of unfairness would depend on calculating adverse "net
effects" of an act or practice, weighing benefits against injuries or a
significant risk of harm, and giving additional weight to whether
consumers' "free market decisions are unjustifiably hindered."44
The changes made at the FTC during the years of the Reagan
administration shifted investigative attention away from the seller's
responsibility to design sales practices that did not confuse, exaggerate, or
conceal qualities and terms, and toward permitting strategies of confusion
when they did not preclude smart and attentive consumers from averting
* * 45
injury.
41. H.R. REP.NO. 98-156, pt.1, at 32 (1983).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006).
43. MICHAEL PERTSCHUK ET AL., FTC, FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS n.12
(1980), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm (presenting FTC's views on
concept of "unfairness" and appended to In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984)).
44. Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 58,509, 59,513 (Sept. 24, 2010) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt 226) (commenting on the FTC interpretation of FTC Credit Practice Rule, 16 C.F.R.
§444.1 (1999)).
45.
For another thing, California (and federal) case law have been very demanding in terms
of the kind of evidence needed to prove[] the likelihood of deception. Thus, in Haskell
v. Time, the court found that declarations from a "few" consumers and a professor of
rhetoric to be insufficient. In William H. Morris Co. v. Group W, Inc., the Ninth Circuit

concluded that the plaintiff had not carried its burden where the evidence consisted of
testimony from two out of 300 recipients. It would be hard to square these proof
requirements with a substantive rule requiring only proof of a "tendency or capacity" to
deceive a credulous consumer.
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A concrete illustration of the shift described here can be drawn from the
present efforts of well-intentioned FTC agents to pursue deception under
the present regime. The credit reporting agency Consumerlnfo.com, which
was acquired by Experian Consumer Direct in April 2002, 46 widely
advertises a profitable website named FreeCreditReport.comon television,
in print, and on the Internet. 4 7 Its target audience includes millions of
Americans who are concerned about their precarious credit or
contemplating
seeking
more
credit.
Despite
its
name,
FreeCreditReport.comis a very costly site.48
American consumers are entitled to free credit reports from Credit
Reporting Agencies, which are regulated by the Fair Credit Reporting Act
and
other
statutes,
and
may
obtain
them
by
using
AnnualCreditReport.com.49 Every consumer can also obtain credit scores
without great expense.50 Nevertheless, the Credit Reporting Agencies do not
widely
advertise
AnnualCreditReport.com, and
Experian-owned
FreeCreditReport.com, in order to better market its largely superfluous
products more effectively, does not reveal this information conspicuouslyeven after promising to do so. 5 I The site makes it highly unlikely that a
consumer will order a "free" report without paying to obtain a score and
monthly reports for a minimum of $16.99 per month, and much more for
other reports, scores, and services. 52 As of February, 2010, the Better
Business Bureau had received more than 11,000 complaints about the
website.53
J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, FTC, Deceptive and Unfair Acts and Practices Principles: Evolution
and Convergence, Address to the California State Bar (May 18, 2007) (footnotes omitted).
46. Experian Unit Settles F.T C. Case and Pays Fine,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2005, at C3.
47. See Stephanie Clifford, The High Cost of a 'Free Credit Report,' N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,

2008, at C9.
48. See photograph, infra Exhibit A.
49. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-168 1x (2006).
50. Credit Scores, CONSUMER REP. (June 2009), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/money

/credit-loan/credit-scores/overview/credit-scores-ov.htm
51. Press Release, FTC, Marketer of "Free Credit Reports" Settles FTC Charges (Aug. 16,
2005), availableat http://ftc.gov/opa/2005/08/consumerinfo.shtm.
52. FREECREDITREPORT.COM, http://www.freecreditreport.coml

(last visited Aug. 30, 2012).

The site does not provide a clear explanation of the difference between a credit score and a credit
report; and few of those who obtain their credit report through FreeCreditReport.comend up
doing so without paying amounts that are not easily calculated for unlimited periods of time. See
supra note 47. In 2010, the FTC enacted a rule "to require certain advertisements for 'free credit
reports' to include prominent disclosures designed to prevent" consumer confusion. Free Annual
File Disclosures, 75, Fed. Reg. 9,726, 9,726 (Mar. 3, 2010) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 610).
In order to sidestep the required disclosures, Experian began charging $1 for credit reports and
giving the money to charity. Rob Lieber, Free Report on Credit? No Longer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,

2010, at B t. Fine print at the top of its website indicates that if someone does nothing after
ordering a $1 credit report, they will be charged $16.99 per month until they terminate the service.
FREECREDITREPORT.COM, http://www.freecreditreport.com/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
53. Julianne Pepitone, Experian Sued Over FreeCreditReport.com,CNNMONEY.COM (Feb. 4,

2009,
7:23
freecreditreport/.

PM)

http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/04/news/companies/experian lawsuit
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For more than a decade, the FTC has tried to force Experian to clean up
its website and to convey information without deception or confusion.54 In
2005, the FTC entered into a settlement agreement and obtained a small
disgorgement of funds after filing a complaint. 5 But as of the date this
Article was written, the television ads and website were, in the opinion of
thousands of people, still misleading, and the FTC has not yet been able to
successfully address the problem.
Why is FreeCreditReport.comstill allowed to operate? The advertising,
directed especially at a vulnerable population of debtors, is confusing and
makes a mockery of the word "free." The website defends itself on the
ground that, inter alia, it has not violated any law relating to unfair or
deceptive practices. 56 According to arguments Experian has made in court,
its websites are educational and the governing "consumer protection
statutes were not meant to stifle, but to encourage, the free flow of
educational materials such as the ones it provides."5 7 A spokesman for the
FTC, who was asked why the website is still up, responded that "the agency
must work within 'a legal framework,' and "does not have the power to
take arbitrary actions."5

II. THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Academic research into behavioral and cognitive psychology during the
years since the 1980s has undermined the Commission's key assumptions
about the reasonable and rational behavior that is to be expected from
economic actors. 59 Nor did this research support the view that maximizing
consumer rationality would maximize the efficiency of free markets.o On
the contrary, research into cognitive behavior has seriously undermined the
rational choice paradigm with persuasive evidence that people who behave
reasonably do not always make optimal, rational choices-consumers who

54. Press Release, FTC, supra note 51.
55. Id.

56. See e.g., Lieber, supra note 52 ("An Experian spokeswoman, Susan Henson, defended the
new fee. 'The offer for the $1 report is very clear and in compliance with the F.T.C.'s rule,' she
said in an e-mail reply to questions."). Interestingly, the standard in France is more protective of
gullible consumers and could potentially prevent Freecreditreport.com from print advertising in
that nation. Charlotte J. Romano, Comparative Advertising in the United States and in France,25

NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 371, 397-98 (2005) (noting that the current French standard protects
"credulous, ignorant and unthinking" consumers). I do not know what the rules are for website
deception.
57. Helms v. Consumerlnfo.com, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1232 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
58. Bob Sullivan, FTC Fights FreeCreditReport.com with Spoof Ad, THE REDTAPE

CHRONICLES ON NBCNEWS.COM (Mar. 10, 2009, 7:28 PM), http://redtape.msnbc.msn.com/_news
/2009/03/10/6345777-ftc-fights-freecreditreportcom-with-spoof-ad?lite.
59. See e.g., Jolls et al., supranote 19, at 1541.
60. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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are "reasonable under the circumstances" do not characteristically behave
like rational actors.
The "reasonable under the circumstances" standard, as noted earlier,
developed during the Reagan administration prior to the years when the
research in behavioral psychology and behavioral economics that
demonstrated the limits of "rational" choice became well known. As late as
1990, when efforts to consider the implications of behavioral psychology
for the development of legal standards started to appear, 62 the legal
academy had not yet come to grips with the impact of cognitive psychology
on legal standards of reasonableness in consumer law, criminal law,
administrative law, or other fields. Not until after 2002, when Daniel
Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics for his work in exploring and
critiquing conventional views about rational choice, did this work prompt a
flood of attention in legal scholarship.
In 2008, Professors Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein
familiarized the legal academy and the public with the implications of the
shortcomings of rational choice models in their book Nudge: Improving
Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness, which presented examples
of the opportunities of generating incorrect answers by playing on cognitive
limits and irrationalities.6 4 A few of their simple illustrations of generated
cognitive mistakes reveal how easily rational actors are misled into making
bad choices:
1. A bat and ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the
ball. How much does the ball cost? _cents
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it
take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? _minutes
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in
size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long
65
would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? _days
Most people, they write, would say that the answers are "10 cents, 100
minutes, and 24 days," respectively.66 As the authors point out, "all these
answers are wrong," and they are wrong because of innate processing
61. See e.g., Jacob Jacoby, Is It Rational to Assume Consumer Rationality? Some Consumer
Psychological Perspectives on Rational Choice Theory 48-50 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law & Bus.,
Working Paper No. CLB-00-009, 2000), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-239538 (discussing
how consumers engage in selective attention and how it is difficult to find rationality in
"tendencies [that] lead consumers to ignore information that it pays them to know and which they
ought to acquire").
62. See e.g., Silber, Observing Reasonable Consumers,supra note 19.

63. The term "cognitive limitations" acquired use between 1970 and 1990. See infra Appendix A.
64. RICHARD R. THALER & CASs R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT

HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 22 (2011).

65. Id. at 21.
66. Id.
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limitations and because of the way in which the problems are framed to
generate difficulty in answering them correctly.67 Thaler and Sunstein argue
that an appreciation of neurological operation and psychology should drive
policymakers and lawmakers to create rules and regulations that are not
based on false assumptions about the employment of reason in decision
making.
Today, cognitive "frailties" can be, and frequently are, exploited by
merchandisers to their advantage.69 Departments of consumer research at
most major corporations devote substantial effort to learning how to sell
their products more effectively than their competitors by using
psychological insights into irrationality, and how to counter logical
objections consumers might have to purchasing their products.70 Ironically,
the older approach taken by the FTC, for all its faults and without the
benefit of the research of recent decades, anticipated this scholarship and
created a rule that would have been immediately responsive to it.71 The
FTC's revised approach undervalued innate aspects of cognitive behavior
which affect rational action in the face of seller conduct, and crafted the rule

accordingly. 72
III. CFPB AND THE POTENTIAL TO RECREATE THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF DECEPTION, UNFAIRNESS, AND
ABUSE
On April 22, 2010, President Obama delivered his landmark address at
the Cooper Union Auditorium near Wall Street, in which he called upon the
67. Id. at 21-22. By considering the problems more closely they will become easier to solve:
If the ball costs 10 cents and the bat costs one dollar more than the ball, meaning $1.10,
then together they cost $1.20, not $1.10. No one who bothers to check whether his
initial answer of 10 cents could possibly be right would give that as an answer, but
research by Shane Frederick (2005) (who calls this series of questions the cognitive
reflection rest) finds that these are the most popular answers even among bright college
students.
The correct answers are 5 cents, 5 minutes, and 47 days, but you knew that, or at least
your Reflective System did if you bothered to consult it.
Id.

68. Id. at 252-53.
69. See id. at 144 ("For mortgages, school loans, and credit cards, life is far more complicated
than it needs to be, and people can be exploited. Often it's best to ask people to take care of
themselves, but when people borrow, standard human frailties can lead to serious hardship and
even disaster.").
70. See, e.g., N. Craig Smith et al., Smart Defaults: From Hidden Persuaders to Adaptive

Helpers 8-14 (INSEAD, Working Paper No. 2009/03/ISIC, 2009), available at http://ssm.com
/abstract- 1116650 (discussing marketing ethics and defaults).
71. See supra pp. 6-7 (discussing "the high water mark for imposing consumer-protective
standards for marketplace behavior" between 1946-1983).
72. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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financial community to support a major overhaul of financial regulation.73
In his speech, he attributed the financial crisis to more than unfairness and
deception:
[T]his financial crisis wasn't just the result of decisions made in the
executive suites on Wall Street; it was also the result of decisions made
around kitchen tables across America, by folks who took on mortgages
and credit cards and auto loans. And while it's true that many Americans
took on financial obligations that they knew or should have known they
could not have afforded, millions of others were, frankly, duped. They
were misled by deceptive terms and conditions, buried deep in the fine
print. 74
Consumers were not only deceived and treated unfairly, they were
abused by sellers who tried to get them to act unreasonably. 75 A few months
later, when the Dodd-Frank legislation became law, it included the
Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA), which created the new
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.7 6 The CFPA transferred from the
FTC to the Bureau the FTC's rulemaking authority with respect to
consumer financial products.n At its creation, the CFPB received authority
73. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Wall Street Reform at Cooper
Union (Apr. 22, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks
-president-wall-street-reform.
74. Id

75. Id. (noting that "a few companies made out like bandits by exploiting their customers").
76. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L.No. 111-203, §§ 1001-1100H, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955-2113 (2010)
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); id § 1031(a), 124 Stat. at 2006 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5531). The CFPB was authorized as an independent bureau within the Federal Reservestatutorily insulated from the Federal Reserve's authority and supervision. Id. § t 101, 124 Stat. at
1964 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491). The Federal Reserve funds the CFPB, but the Bureau sets its
own budget. Id. § 10 17(b), 124 Stat. at 1977-78 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5497). The CFPB has a
single director who serves a five-year term. Id § 101 1(b), 124 Stat. at 1964 (codified at 12. U.S.C.
§ 5491(b)). The Director was, by statute, designated to be appointed by the President with
confirmation from the Senate. Id. § 1011(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1964 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5491(b)(2)). In an effort to force Congress to diminish the autonomy of the Bureau, Senate
Republicans declined, through procedural maneuvers, to permit confirmation of the actual
nominee, Richard Cordray. See Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama
Appoints Consumer Chief N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2010, at Al. The President nonetheless appointed

Cordray as Director through a recess appointment. Id. Most of the arguments currently being
made about the legitimacy of the Bureau, the enforceability of its rules and regulations, and the
transferability of some other agencies' regulatory authority pursuant to the enabling statute stem
from this series of events.
77. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the FTC retained its authority to enforce those rules and to
continue defining acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive with regards to non-depository
institutions. Dodd-Frank Act § 1061(b)(5), 124 Stat. at 2036-38 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5581(b)(5)). Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce." Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). The FTC also has
the authority to enforce rules prescribed by the CFPB under its "unfair, deceptive or abusive"
authority as to entities in its jurisdiction. Id. There are also statutes enforced by the FTC yet
outside FTC rulemaking authority, which rulemaking authority Congress gave the Bureau. Thus,
the FTC never had rulemaking authority concerning the collection of debts covered by the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, but Dodd-Frank conferred rulemaking authority on the CFPB. See,
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from eighteen consumer protection statutes and regulations that were
previously covered by many other agencies. 78
The CFPB had been delegated considerable power to regulate consumer
financial products-more than the FTC possessed when consumer financial
products were within its jurisdiction. In addition to granting the Bureau the
authority to issue regulations prohibiting "unfair or deceptive" acts or
practices, Congress, as mentioned above, added the word "abusive" and
included within its grant of authority extensive rulemaking, examination,
and enforcement power. 79 The CFPB announced that its enforcement
standard for unfair and deceptive practices would be consistent with the
FTC's 1980 actions and its 1983 Policy Statement.80 In guidance that it
e.g., id. §§ 1024(c), 1025(c), 124 Stat. at 1989, 1991 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5514(c), 5515(c)).
The CFPB is required to coordinate its rulemaking with the FTC to ensure that there is no overlap
or conflicts between the two agencies. Id.; see also FTC & CFPB, MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL

PROTECTION BUREAU (2012) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING],

available at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/01/120123flc-cfpb-mou.pdf.
78. Dodd-Frank Act § 1002, 124 Stat. at 1957 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481) (defining
"enumerated consumer laws"). The agencies that gave up some or all of their power to the CFPB
include the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Association, the Director of the Office of Thrift
Supervision and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. These consumer agencies
all add their own interpretations of who a reasonable consumer is and who the agency ought to be
protecting. The date that this authority was meant to transfer to the CFPB was designated as the
"transfer date." See id § 1062, 124 Stat. at 2039 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5582). Prior to the
appointment of the Bureau Director, the Secretary of the Treasury had interim authority to run the
CFPB. Id § 1066, 124 Stat. at 2055 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5586). The Treasury Secretary set
July 21, 2011 as the designated date. See Designated Transfer Date, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,252, 57,252
(Sept. 20, 2010).
79. Dodd-Frank Act § 1031, 124 Stat. at 2005-06 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).
The Bureau may take any action authorized ... to prevent a covered person or service
provider from committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice
under Federal law in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer
financial product or service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or service.
Id
80. See generally CFPB, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL, at UDAAP

1-10

[hereinafter, CFPB EXAM MANUAL] (summarizing CFPB position on Unfair, Deceptive, or
Abusive Acts or Practices (UDAAP)). To declare a practice unlawful because it is unfair, the
Bureau must have "a reasonable basis to conclude that-(A) the act or practice causes or is likely
to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers; and (B)
such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition."
Dodd-Frank Act § 1031(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 2006 (codified in 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1)). The CFPB
standard is consistent with the FTC standard. Although "the Bureau may consider established
public policies as evidence . . . [s]uch considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such
determination." Id. § 1031(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 2006 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(2)). No
definition for "deceptive" is provided in the Dodd-Frank Act. But, the CFPB has provided that:
A representation, omission, actor practice is deceptive when:
(1) The representation, omission, act, or practice misleads or is likely to mislead the
consumer;
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issued, the CFPB stated that "[a]lthough abusive acts also may be unfair or
deceptive, . . . the legal standards for abusive, unfair, and deceptive each are

separate."8' It proceeded to issue general guidelines describing the way in
which the new term "abusiveness" would be regulated.82
And so, going forward, the CPFB stands in a position to move "back to
the future": to reformulate the definitions of unfairness and deception in
order to bring them in line with the developments that have occurred in
cognitive psychology and consumer behavior within the last thirty years. It
also has the authority to develop the "abusiveness" standard to focus on
sellers' abuse of consumers.
IV. POLICY SHIFT: INCORPORATING BEHAVIORAL
PSYCHOLOGY INTO THE CFPB'S AGENCY
JURISPRUDENCE
It is beyond the scope of this Article to develop in detail the way in
which the new agency should redevelop unfairness and deception and
develop a new standard for abusiveness. But query how differently the
marketplace would look if the CFPB could establish a standard that shifts
attention from whether buyers could have avoided injury by behaving
reasonably to whether sellers could have avoided confusing consumers by
conveying information fairly. Why not make it plain that, in the case of
deceptiveness, unfairness, and abusiveness, the CFPB will, assuming other
elements of the offense are established, prosecute financial institutions

(2) The consumer's interpretation of the representation, omission, act, or practice is
reasonable under the circumstances, and
(3) The misleading representation, omission, act, or practice is material.
CFPB EXAM MANUAL, supra, at UDAAP 5 (citing the FTC Policy Statement on Deception
and instructing that "[e]xaminers should be informed by the FTC's standard for deception").
Cooperation and consultation between the CFPB and the FTC in providing guidance in these
matters is mandatory. See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 77.
81. CFPB EXAM MANUAL, supra note 80, at UDAAP 9.

82. An abusive act or practice is defined as one that:
Materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition
of a consumer financial product or service or

0

Takes unreasonable advantage of*

A lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service;

*

The inability of the consumer to protect its interests in
selecting or using a consumer financial product or service; or

*

The reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person
to act in the interests of the consumer.

CFPB EXAM MANUAL, supra note 80, at UDAAP 9.
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whose representations and agreements have the effect of exploiting known
cognitive limitations and that cause substantial injuries to consumers?83
Of course, such a rule would not resolve important issues of linedrawing. Pricing a product at $9.99 instead of $10, for example, leads many
consumers to frame a product as a $9 product instead of a $10 product, and
has the effect of exploiting a known cognitive limitation that can cause an
injury to consumers.
Reasonable minds may differ as to whether injuries caused by these
cognitive deceptions are substantial, but shifting to a standard for
truthfulness that corresponds to our actual understanding of consumer
behavior would revolutionize the marketplace.

83. If the regulations were reoriented inthe manner suggested here, financial institutions might
argue that the suggested approach infringes a First Amendment right to exaggerate or puff. See
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 467 (1988). However, "[tihe common theme that
seems to run through cases considering puffery in a variety of contexts is that consumer reliance
will be induced by specific rather than general assertions." Cook, Perkins & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal.
Collection Serv., 911 F.2d 242, 246 (9th Cir. 1990). A statement that is quantifiable-that makes a
claim as to the "specific or absolute characteristics of a product"-is actionable. Id. at 245. A
prohibition of unspecific assertions that have the effect of misleading has been upheld against a
First Amendment challenge. See id
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